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Ruthless Player or Development Partner? Britain’s ambiguous 
reaction to China in Africa 
 
Julia Gallagher, Royal Holloway, University of London 
 
Abstract 
 
British reactions to China’s increasing engagement with Africa in 
recent years have been manifested in particularly negative and 
reductive ways tending to depict China’s presence in Africa as 
destructive and self-serving, in contrast to Britain’s more 
enlightened, supportive approach. However, more recently official 
discourse has begun to stress the shared outlook between British 
and Chinese objectives, emphasising Chinese moves towards a 
more constructive, development-focused approach in Africa. This 
article discusses the ways in which China in Africa is viewed in 
British political circles and assesses the degree to which such views 
resonate with the British sense of its own idealised identity. It 
suggests that the two narratives represent two sides of a dual 
‘liberal’ approach to the problem of ‘non-liberal’ actors in 
international politics: first the tendency to reject and see them as 
outside the international order; and second the attempt to 
rehabilitate them and bring them within it. The article concludes 
by exploring a number of reasons for the particular ways in which 
Britain, China and Africa are configured, arguing that this dual 
conception represents a sense of ambiguity about the potential 
universality of liberalism. 
 
 
British elites, proud of Britain’s enlightened and benign policy in 
sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, only gradually begun to wake 
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up to China’s growing presence there.1 It was as if a child, earnestly 
engaged in building an elaborate sandcastle has just realised that a 
bigger child, with a tractor and a very different concept of what a 
sandcastle should look like, had arrived and begun destroying and 
building on the same patch of sand. British reactions take two 
forms. The initial and popular reaction – found amongst 
backbench MPs and some government officials who work on 
Africa, and amplified in the media – has been one of hostility and 
suspicion: ‘British space’ has been invaded, ‘British projects’ 
spoiled. A second view has also begun to emerge in government 
documents, which suggests that China’s engagement is to be 
welcomed as potentially positive and beneficial for Africa; that 
China, with help from Britain, might come to realise the benefits of 
                                                 
1An early version of this article was presented at the European 
Africa Studies Conference in Leipzig, June 2009. Thanks to Roland 
Marchal, Daniel Large, Chris Alden, Hannes Bauman, Manjeet 
Ramgotra and the anonymous RIS reviewers who read and made 
many useful comments on earlier drafts of the article. 
 
 Throughout the article I will be discussing sub-Saharan Africa 
(hereafter simply referred to as ‘Africa’). In ignoring north Africa I 
am reflecting the British policy understanding of the continent 
which groups north Africa in with the Middle East (MENA). Egypt, 
Libya and Algeria, for example, are therefore treated as part of a 
region which offers more pressing and complex political, 
economic and security interests and challenges to that of sub-
Saharan Africa which is largely viewed in terms of aid and 
development. The exception to this is South Africa which has 
always appeared to present exceptional political and trade interests. 
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the international consensus on how to engage with Africa.2  These 
represent a pragmatism, according to Chris Alden, that has seen a 
series of cautious attempts to engage with Chinese activity on the 
continent.3 More recently they have become overtly welcoming, 
suggesting that China and Britain actually share objectives to some 
degree in Africa, and that it might be possible to further reconcile 
their work there.  
 
How far is this new pragmatic perspective displacing the hostile 
reaction, or are these reflections of persistently diverse and even 
contradictory reactions to China’s engagement in Africa? More 
broadly, what can such reactions tell us about tendencies to 
demonise and socialise within IR – most particularly in the context 
of a state that sees itself as part of a liberal international 
community, and its reaction to states that lie beyond this 
community? 
 
This article attempts to explore and explain elite British reactions 
to China’s engagement in Africa. It draws on interviews with British 
politicians and officials who work on African policy or engage 
there through the work on All-Party Parliamentary Groups on 
                                                 
2 For an example of this more cautious approach which both 
welcomes the potential benefits of China’s engagement in Africa, 
while gently pointing towards the importance of promoting good 
governance, see DfID fact sheet: ‘Promoting Growth in Africa: 
working with China’, (2006), 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/china-africa-
factsheet.pdf [cited, 7 July, 2009] 
3 Chris Alden: China in Africa. (London: Zed Books, 2007) p 108 
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Africa, and on government documents and speeches produced by 
the Foreign Office (FCO) and Department for International 
Development (DfID). Through an examination of discourses about 
Africa and China’s role there, it establishes a picture of the way in 
which ideas of British-African-Chinese relationships are 
constituted, and makes suggestions as to how these stem from and 
help reinforce a sense of state identity.  
 
In the first section I will argue that the British conception of Africa 
and its policy in recent years there is best understood within a 
constructivist ontology. The role of ideas in forming British self-
conception and policy is particularly resonant in Africa because of 
the relative lack of British material interests there. This can be 
highlighted through a comparison with recent French and US 
policy in Africa both of which are rooted in more tangible interests. 
It is therefore more plausible to understand the French and US 
attitudes towards Africa and Chinese engagement there within a 
more realist framework, while the role of ideas and identity play a 
much larger role in the British case. The rest of the article discusses 
the two British approaches to Chinese engagement in Africa, 
drawing on official policy documents and interviews with British 
politicians and officials, and exploring historical parallels. Section 
two explores historical comparisons and precedents, focusing on 
British demonization of rival European powers during the colonial 
project in Africa. The third section describes the modern 
demonization of China by British policy elites; and the fourth 
discusses the more rational and newly-emerging discourse that 
seeks to describe a new British relationship with China over Africa 
as one of tutor in development, bringing China within wider liberal 
epistemologies.  
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Finally, I will explore the possible meanings of such depictions. I 
will suggest that both the demonization of China in this African 
context, and the idea that China can be civilised by Britain, are 
reflections of a particular liberal sense of self. This draws on Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s suggestion that liberal historicism views non-liberal 
others as both external to the civilised world, in opposition to it, 
destabilising and potentially destructive, and as potentially – 
perhaps inevitably – redeemable, able to be reconciled to the 
liberal, rational, universal logic. Liberalism both ‘recognises and 
neutralises difference’.4 The particular example of British 
perceptions of China in Africa highlights the tension between this 
dual approach to difference and, I suggest, illustrates an ambiguity 
with the idea that liberalism can be universalised – that the 
inevitability and logic of liberalism which must absorb all non-
liberal actors is constantly undermined by the tendency to 
objectify or reify the villainous, outlying ‘other’. The conclusion of 
the article explores the extent to which both views – although they 
exist in tension – might have come to underwrite a British 
subjectivity and identity: one in providing an alternative ‘other’, 
foil to the subject’s logic and rightness; the other as an affirmation 
that alternatives are unviable and must succumb to the logic of 
liberal modernity. 
 
 
Constructing British policy in Africa 
                                                 
4 Dipesh Chakrabarty: Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and 
historical difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) p 
48 
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Peter Hays Gries, in his study of Chinese foreign policy, argues that 
international relationships shape national self-perception through 
the interdependence of discourse, policy and identity. In his 
example, the relationship between China and America is partially 
constitutive of a collective Chinese identity.5 It can also, of course, 
be argued that identity shapes international relations: the way we 
see ourselves defines the way we relate to others internationally. 
This approach departs from realist ‘interest-based’ accounts that 
suggest that foreign policy and international relations are purely or 
largely generated by domestic or state material interests, in 
particular security, geo-political strategy and economic 
opportunity.  
 
In the case of Africa, in particular, the relationship between British 
identity and the imagination of Africa and British policy there were 
redefined in particular ways during the Blair era, driven by key 
actors’ ethical and emotional attachment to Africa; by the Labour 
Party’s identification with particular causes such as the anti-
colonial and anti-Apartheid movements; by broader historical 
conceptions of Britain’s benign role in Africa in, for example, the 
abolition of the slave trade and the civilising colonial mission; and 
by the way these resonated with modern British conceptions of 
Africa popularised by celebrity-driven aid initiatives and the 
                                                 
5 Peter Hays Gries: China's New Nationalism: pride, politics and 
diplomacy (Berkley: University of California Press, 2004) p 19 
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British media’s depictions of Africa as an object of pity and charity 
which could be rescued through British efforts.6  
 
Ideationally, such depictions were brought to play within a liberal 
cosmopolitan order promoted by Blair – described for example in 
his 1999 Chicago speech on the doctrine of the international 
community – which promoted liberal intervention and the 
responsibility to protect as moral imperatives. In doing this Blair 
sought to identify and to shape an implicit understanding of a 
liberal international community within which he sought to define 
Britain. 
 
The self-understanding of this liberal international community 
rests on implicit or ‘deep’ theory and assumptions about 
                                                 
6 New Labour’s adoption in 1997 of a foreign policy with an ‘ethical 
element’, and the establishment of DfID, were part of an attempt to 
differentiate itself from the outgoing Conservative administration 
which had pursued a more overtly realist foreign policy, in which 
international development was relatively neglected. On Africa in 
particular, its approach had been defined by what Labour regarded 
as a sacrifice of principle to material interests in the refusal to 
impose sanctions on South Africa in the 1980s, and neglect, as in 
the failure to intervene to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. 
The establishment of DfID, in particular, was meant to 
demonstrate the increased importance of international aid, and the 
separation of the aid agenda from the more ‘political’ FCO. DfID 
came to represent the ‘moral wing’ of government. See Julia 
Gallagher: Britain and Africa under Blair: in pursuit of the good state 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming, 2011) 
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individualism, choice, rights and liberty.7 For my purposes here, 
there are two important liberal themes that identify ‘liberal states’ 
and differentiate them from ‘illiberal states’. The first is a 
cosmopolitan sense of the universality of morality that is rooted in 
the individual. It leads to the idea that it is possible and desirable to 
frame and promote a set of universal norms, embodied, for 
example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Criminal Court that promotes and pursues universal 
justice. Non-liberal states are those whose political elites deny or 
resist these; and they are the states upon which the reforming 
efforts of such institutions are focused. The discourse tends to 
assume an affinity between non-elites in these countries and liberal 
values, leading to the idea that international liberal actors support 
and speak for ordinary people. The second is an implicit sense of 
progress, which is due to the growth of rationality. Political 
differences are depicted as a struggle between ‘progressive’ liberals 
versus ideological, backward-looking or unenlightened non-liberals 
– the ‘outlying other’. The progress of rationality should see an 
increasing convergence as modernisation converts and harmonises. 
One key way for this to happen is through processes of 
‘socialisation’, which, for many liberals, is achieved through 
multilateralism; the coordinating of national policies in 
international forums and institutions (nominal multilateralism), 
and the increasing sharing of norms and principles (qualitative 
                                                 
7 David Williams: ‘Liberalism and “Development Discourse”’ Africa, 
63, no. 3, (1993), pp 419-29 
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multilateralism).8 Liberals are ostensibly optimistic – they assume 
that persuasive undercurrents will gradually lead to the reform and 
rehabilitation of non-liberals. 
 
This approach supported a host of British Africa initiatives 
including military intervention in Sierra Leone to restore a 
democratically-elected regime, substantial increases in aid and 
debt-write-off for the poorest, reform-minded African 
governments, and culminated in a ‘year for Africa’ in 2005 during 
which Blair launched his Commission for Africa.9 And it resonated 
with – and in time contributed to – the broader liberal 
international consensus on Africa defined around the promotion of 
‘universal’ goods such as human rights, good governance and 
international justice.10 Africa as an on-going site of development 
and good projects came to engender a sense of Britain as an 
energetic and potent international actor, playing a key role in an 
idealised liberal international order. Thus Africa in recent years 
became an important expression of Britain’s best liberal self for 
Britain’s political elites.11  
                                                 
8 John Ruggie: ‘Third Try at World Order? America and 
multilateralism after the Cold War’, Political Science Quarterly, 109, 
no. 4 (1994) pp 553-70 
9 For an account of Blair’s Africa policies, see Tom Porteous: Britain 
in Africa, (London: Zed Books, 2008) 
10 Tom Young: ‘“A project to be realised”: global liberalism and 
contemporary Africa’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24: 
3: 1995, pp. 527-46 
11 This approach was shared across the mainstream political 
spectrum, by Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs, 
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The idea of British aggression or pursuit of self-interest is largely 
absent from this depiction. Instead, Britain engages with Africa 
because it is a ‘moral cause’, a ‘duty’ and ‘the right thing to do’.12 
This is far more than a rhetorical approach: the idea of Africa as a 
cause for Britain, and of the British state engaging there in a pure 
and disinterested way is an important component of British state 
actors’ conception of themselves and the political system they 
engage in. Africa matters to Britain as a representation of an 
‘ethical foreign policy’, a point of differentiation from other parts 
of state activity and policy, and from the ways in which other parts 
of the world engage there. As such, it contributes to a sense of 
British identity as a generous and benign actor, projecting an ideal 
Britain – generous, altruistic, capable and just – onto Africa. 13 
 
The traction of such an approach has been increased by the relative 
lack of tangible British interests in the continent. According to 
Christopher Clapham, this was a significant factor behind British 
indifference towards Africa from independence up to the Blair 
                                                                                                                                           
Labour ministers, special advisors and officials from DfID and the 
FCO. Julia Gallagher: ‘Healing the Scar: idealism, Africa and British 
policy under Blair’, African Affairs, 2009, 108, 432: pp 435-51 
12 Blair described British policy in Africa in these terms in a speech 
he made in Ethiopia: Tony Blair: ‘Speech on Africa, Addis Ababa, 7 
October 2004’, Downing Street Website: www.number-10.gov.uk [cited 
16 March, 2006] 
13 Gallagher: ‘Healing the Scar’ 
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era.14 However, the revival of engagement with Africa under Blair 
has been interpreted by some as being rooted in more material 
interests such as pacifying dissatisfied Labour Party members, 
maintaining a position of power over Africa, or promoting 
capitalist relations internationally.15 Elements of self-interest 
doubtless do exist – Africa’s oil reserves are exploited by British 
companies, the British arms industry occasionally wins lucrative 
contracts from African governments.16 These tend to be either 
neutralised under a harmonies of interest discourse – promoting 
trade supports our economy and their development – or allowed 
to quietly bubble along under the surface, occasionally popping up 
to embarrass the FCO, as, for example, happened with BAE deals in 
                                                 
14 Christopher Clapham: Africa and the International System: the 
politics of state survival, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 
15 See: David Chandler: 'Rhetoric without Responsibility: the 
attraction of 'ethical' foreign policy', British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 5, no. 3 (2003); David Slater and Morag Bell: 
'Aid and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial: critical reflections on 
New Labour's overseas development strategy', Development and 
Change 33, no. 2 (2002); Paul Cammack: 'Global Governance, State 
Agency and Competitiveness: the political economy of the 
Commission for Africa', British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 8 (2006)   
16 For a discussion on Britain’s rather small interest in African oil 
(chiefly in Angola and Nigeria), see Porteous: Britain in Africa, pp 
43-4. For a discussion of the UK arms trade with Africa, see Ian 
Taylor: The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa, (New York: 
Continuum), 2010, pp 39-41. 
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Tanzania and South Africa. In contrast, efforts to reign in UK 
commercial interests where they were thought to be in conflict 
with benign objectives have been made, as for example in the 
ending of the link between trade and aid, the heavy pressure put on 
pharmaceutical companies to make cheap anti-retroviral drugs 
available in Africa, and attempts to restrict oil companies operating 
in the Niger Delta pursuing environmentally damaging practices.17  
 
Since 9/11 the idea that British foreign policy in Africa has been 
shaped by concern over international terrorism – often linked to 
the opportunities offered to it by weak states – has also been 
argued.18 I think this has been overplayed, often due to the 
tendency to conflate British and US approaches to Africa and 
security. There are substantial differences in the historical and 
ideological engagement between the US and UK in Africa with the 
idea of Africa and Britain in Africa maintaining a stronger hold in 
British officials’ imaginations. Moreover, British institutions are 
very different, with DfID playing a far more assertive part in the 
shaping of British Africa policy than USAID does in America. The 
view of Africa as outside foreign policy as usual has been 
reinforced by the growing clout of DfID in Africa where DfID posts 
usually exceed FCO posts in size and budget.19 This has been 
supported by the influence of key British politicians and officials in 
recent years who have identified themselves closely with the line 
                                                 
17 Interviews with FCO and DfID officials, 2007-9. 
18 Ibid; Jan Bachmann and Jana Honke: ‘”Peace and Security” as 
counterterrorism? The political effects of liberal interventions in 
Kenya’, African Affairs, 109, no. 434 (2010) 
19 Interviews with FCO and DfID officials, 2007-9. 
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promoted by the development agencies, the churches and key 
charismatic figures such as Bob Geldof and Bono.20 If foreign 
policy is directed within a melting pot of varying interests and 
ideas, the mix has been heavily dominated since 1997 by the sense 
of Britain’s ‘ideal mission’ in Africa. Indeed, it remains difficult to 
establish the existence of tangible interests in countries such as 
Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Uganda, all of which receive large 
amounts of British support.  
 
The British approach can be contrasted with those of France and 
the US where more overt interest-based approaches lend 
themselves more to a realist interpretation. France, for example, 
while also holding its relationship with Francophone Africa as 
intrinsic to its identity, has tended to pursue material interests far 
more energetically and openly.21 The US, on the other hand, has 
                                                 
20 Geldof and Bono have both been drafted in to support the 
political parties’ development agendas. For example, Geldof was a 
key player in Blair’s Africa Commission, and was later drafted in by 
David Cameron to help formulate Conservative policy on aid. 
Bono has made appearances at both parties’ annual conferences. 
Both they, alongside British development NGOs and churches, 
were particularly vocal in supporting Blair’s ‘year for Africa’ in 
2005, formulating and promoting the Make Poverty History 
Campaign. See Graham Harrison: ‘The Africanization of Poverty: a 
retrospective on “Make Poverty History”’, African Affairs, 
doi:10.1093/afraf/adq025. 
21 On this, see Guy Martin: ‘Continuity and Change in Franco-
African Relations’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 22, no. 1 
(1995)  
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traditionally ignored much of Africa, motivated by the perception 
that there are virtually no tangible interests there.22 More recently, 
Bill Clinton became interested prioritising a development agenda 
in Africa, something that was taken up by George W. Bush, 
especially in a high-budget AIDS programme and, since 9/11, 
concerns over terrorism in east Africa, coupled with Africa’s 
significant contribution to US energy requirements, have led to a 
more substantial military engagement.23 
 
Interestingly, the approach which comes closest to British self-
idealisation is an older Chinese conception of its engagement in 
Africa, a conception that survives both in current Chinese state 
rhetoric and popular Chinese conceptions of Africa and China’s 
role there. Julia Strauss, in her discussion of the Chinese state’s 
representation of its approach to Africa, illustrates the ways in 
which policy is rationalised and idealised in terms of China’s very 
different ideologies of self-determination, non-interference and 
the sanctity of sovereignty, and solidarity between former colonies 
and fellow-developing countries. This was a key driver of aid 
projects like the Tazara Railway, built in Tanzania and Zambia by 
the Chinese in the 1960s, which was conceived as reflecting a 
Chinese ethos. ‘The success of the friendship railroad was ascribed 
to elements that were in microcosm projections of China’s best 
                                                 
22 See Todd Moss: ‘US Policy and Democratisation in Africa: the 
limits of liberal universalism’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
33, no. 2 (1995) 
23 Nicolas van der Walle: ‘US Policy towards Africa: the Bush legacy 
and the Obama administration’, African Affairs 109, no. 434 (2010); 
Taylor: The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa, pp 24-34 
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revolutionary self.’ 24 Strauss makes the point that in content and 
degree, China’s engagement with the continent has moved far from 
disinterested aid projects like the Tazara Railway towards more 
straightforwardly self-interested investment, but much of the 
original ethos survives in rhetoric. ‘China’s discourse on Africa 
continues to propagate a vision of China as a uniquely moral 
international actor.’25  
 
Support for this comes too from Simon Shen’s research on the 
Chinese online communities’ perceptions of Africa which suggests 
that the state’s idealised depictions of China’s relationships in 
Africa find popular resonance.26 In his examination of the ways 
Africa is described, Shen suggests a number of factors that propel 
this idealisation, including the ways in which Africa’s perceived 
backwardness and role as a pupil to China is valued as a signifier of 
Chinese progress, order and success, as well as an example of 
China’s enlightened international role. For example, ‘China’s 
authoritarian model seems be to able to offer a perfect substitute 
for the chaos in Africa.’27 Also, ‘without this junior partner and 
admirer of China reflecting China’s relative success, the Chinese 
users find it hard to flaunt their sense of superiority… The Chinese 
                                                 
24 Julia Strauss: ‘The Past in the Present: historical and rhetorical 
lineages in China's relations with Africa’, China Quarterly, 199, 
(2009), pp 777-95 
25 Ibid. 
26 Simon Shen: ‘A Constructed (un)reality on China’s Re-entry into 
Africa: the Chinese online community perception of Africa (2006-
2008)’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 47, no. 3, (2009) pp 425-448  
27 Ibid, p 439 
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commitment to Africa still gives them [the online communities] a 
sense of national pride.’28 
 
In this way, for both Britain and China, Africa has been a means of 
association with a sense of a good project. It represents a source of 
affirmation that the state (British or Chinese) is connected to and 
author of ‘good’. For Britain, this is achieved through its place in 
the liberal international order and the expression of itself as a 
benign, liberal actor in Africa. Thus while foreign policy might be 
viewed as a composite of the various institutional rationalities, and 
the motivations and constructions of the actors involved, the 
constructivist approach which favours ideas over interests is 
particularly useful in the case of Britain, Africa and China in Africa. 
 
In summary, Britain’s liberal identity draws on its relationship with 
Africa through resonances with carefully selected historical 
moments when Britain ‘did good’ in Africa; and through Blair’s 
cooption of Labour traditions of internationalism and support for 
development. Africa, partly because of the relative lack of material 
British interests there, allows it to fit into and even lead, a liberal 
international community project, and to define and express its 
liberalism directly through development policy. Finally, this 
incorporation of Africa into the British sense of itself has pervaded 
the political scene more widely, to the point that Britain’s new 
coalition government has committed itself to continuing the 
engagement and policy.29 
                                                 
28 Ibid, p 441 
29 For example, the Queen’s speech immediately following the 
election promised that the new government would honour the 
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‘Gin-soaked Africa’: the need for a villain 
 
British self-idealisation in Africa draws on a lineage of discourse 
about Britain’s good role in Africa which has woven in and out of 
British engagement there since the abolition of the slave trade.30 At 
some times, and in some hands, it has been used rhetorically to 
justify or disguise more venal British interests. But it has also 
contained a deeper and more profound meaning for many people 
in Britain, coming to define the way Britain has viewed itself and 
its role in the world as enlightened. Within this discourse there has 
always been the need for a villainous other – the Americans, 
French and Portugese during the abolition debates; the French and 
Belgians during the late 19th Century colonial expansion; China 
itself, for example during the early part of the 20th Century.31 
                                                                                                                                           
previous government’s commitment to increasing overseas aid to 
0.7 per cent of GNI by 2013. See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-
Room/News-Stories/2010/Firm-commitment-to-07/ [cited, 17 June 
2010] 
30 The colonial era allowed far more leeway to overtly aggressive 
approaches to Africa. The defence of British material interests – its 
need for markets and primary commodities, its jostling with 
European colonial powers for position and influence – appeared to 
be more natural and justifiable than are allowed in Britain today. It 
might therefore be argued that the colonial era contained a greater 
(if tacit) acknowledgement that altruism was mixed in with self-
interest than is the case, certainly in Britain, today. 
31 For example, see Thomas Fowell Buxton: The African Slave Trade 
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Britain’s representation of Africa as a site of its own grander 
purpose was manifest in its uniquely noble role in the abolition of 
the slave trade – the pursuit of what was right, against its own self-
interest – is a cherished part of the British myth of itself.32 Its 
colonial expansion in the late 19th Century was also represented as 
one of serving wider, humane interests, such as the promotion of 
free trade for the benefit of the world, and the promotion of 
progress and salvation for Africans.33 As Alice Conklin argues, such 
views were more than rhetorical. ‘The faith of yesterday’s empire 
builders in the moral legitimacy of their enterprise was all but 
absolute.’34 This is not to deny the more selfish motivations 
involved, particularly during the colonial conquest itself. However, 
a more ‘enlightened’ approach was a significant element, both 
                                                                                                                                           
and its Remedy, (London: John Murray, 1840); Adam Hochschild: 
King Leopold’s Ghost: a story of greed, terror and heroism in colonial 
Africa, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999); Kynoch, Gary: 
‘“Your Petitioners are in Mortal Terror”: the violent world of 
Chinese workers in South Africa, 1904-1910’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies 31, no. 3, (2005)  
32 Linda Colley: Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, 2nd ed. (New 
Haven, Conn. London: Yale Nota Bene, 2005) 
33 For one of the most coherent explanations of Britain’s higher 
motives in Africa, see the memoirs of Nigeria’s first British 
governor Frederick Lugard: The Dual Mandate in British Tropical 
Africa, (London: William Blackwood, 1926) 
34 Alice Conklin: ‘Colonialism and Human Rights, a Contradiction 
in Terms? The case of France and West Africa, 1895-1914’, American 
Historical Review 103, no. 2 (1998) p 419 
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rhetorically and in this sense of the British state engaging in a pure 
and good cause. 
 
An important part of the way in which British actors explained and 
justified their role in Africa was in terms of the contrast with others 
with less benign intentions. Thomas Buxton, for example, details 
the barbaric practices of the Portugese and various slave traders 
from the Americas, which shocked British policy makers and 
public and led to the British naval blockade of west Africa in an 
attempt to stop the trade, and the government’s support of Sierra 
Leone, the struggling colony for freed slaves.35  During the late 19th 
and early 20th century, the British were equally stirred up by 
accounts of Belgian atrocities in the Congo, brought to public 
attention by E. D. Morel and the sensational report by Roger 
Casement in 1904.36 And the French always featured heavily in 
comparisons made between the welfare of the natives in British 
and French-owned colonies. Africans, it was argued, fared better 
under the British who were concerned with their material and 
spiritual improvement and were altruistically engaged in stamping 
out slavery and fetish-practices, while the French sold them cheap 
gin and selfishly reserved African markets for themselves.37 
                                                 
35 Buxton: The African Slave Trade and its Remedy 
36 Hochschild: King Leopold’s Ghost 
37 A flavour of this can be found in a newspaper report of 1899 
about the protests of liquor traffic in Africa. ‘Crowded and earnest 
was the meeting yesterday of the Native Races and Liquor Traffic 
United Committee at Grosvenor House. The Duke of Westminster 
took the chair. In 1894, he said, the imported spirits into Lagos 
were valued at £117,139. Then the duty was raised to 2s a gallon, 
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Unsurprisingly, French attempts to depict their role in a more 
positive light were dismissed as hypocrisy by the British. As the 
British Governor of Sierra Leone Edward Cardew said of the 
French colonies in west Africa: ‘The secret of their success appears 
to be that they keep their motto of “Egalite, Liberte et Fraternite” for 
home consumption and do not apply it to those colonies where the 
people are not sufficiently educated and civilised for it.’38 This 
strongly paternalistic tone echoes uncomfortably today in many of 
the comments made about China’s corrupting influence on 
apparently incapable Africans. 
 
Britain apparently needed an alter-ego in its dealings with Africa. It 
was as though its own ‘good’ could only be properly realised 
through the contrast that could be made with others who showed 
no principle in their dealings with Africa. Seven while there is a 
sense of the mission to reform, save and enlighten the ‘dark 
continent’, always on the sidelines are the spoilers. To what extent 
are these an essential ingredient to the British self-conception as a 
‘good’ actor in Africa? I will return to this question in the 
                                                                                                                                           
with the result that the import of 1896 was only £58,906. In 
proportion the natives became industrious and respectable. 
Contrast Dahomey under French rule, where spirits were only 
taxed at 8d per gallon, and the consumption rose from 1,000,000f 
worth in 1894 to 4,000,000f worth in 1896.’ The Star, ‘Gin-Soaked 
Africa’, 18 May, 1899, p 2 
38 Governor Edward Cardew to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonial Office (Rt Hon, Joseph Chamberlain), 28 May 1898, 
Government papers Colonial Office Dispatches, Sierra Leone, 1898 
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conclusion. First, I want to detail the modern manifestation of the 
spoiler to British efforts in Africa: China. 
 
 
China as a villain in Africa 
 
In the modern British account of Anglo-African relations, China 
takes on the role of villain once reserved for other European 
nations. Indeed, China’s emergence in Africa is a potentially 
confusing and destabilising one. If a flattened and idealised Africa 
appears to confirm possibilities for good intervention by Britain as 
a liberal actor, an equally flattened China can be seen to represent a 
rejection of and threat to it, undermining both British 
predominance in Africa by presenting an alternative non-liberal 
partner, and disrupting the idealised, smooth international liberal 
order.  
 
In popular British accounts of China in Africa, China is depicted as 
a straightforward villain. This can be seen in media discussions of 
China in Africa, as discussed by Emma Mawdsley,39 and through 
comments made by political elites which broadly echo (if in 
slightly more restrained terms) the media line. The story of China 
as villain unfolds in four steps. First, Africa is helpless: its leaders 
are corrupt and/or inept; its populations battered and long-
suffering. Second, the British have led the way in developing a 
                                                 
39 Emma Mawdsley: ‘Fu Manchu Versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark 
Continent? Representing China, Africa and the West in British 
broadsheet newspapers’, Political Geography, doi; 
10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.03.006 (2008) 
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rescue plan that will induce better behaviour from Africa’s leaders 
towards Africa’s populations. Myles Wickstead, the senior official in 
charge of Blair’s Commission for Africa said:  
 
In a number of countries you don’t or you haven’t had 
the systems whereby governments can be electorally 
accountable with strong parliaments and whatever. So 
in a way I think the donor community has historically 
acted as a little bit of a proxy for the electorate in those 
countries and tried to stand up for the ordinary person, 
saying these sugar prices are penalising your people 
and shouldn’t you do something about that? So I think 
in a way, for perfectly honourable motives, the 
international community has acted as a proxy and an 
advocate of people. 40 
 
This approach rests implicitly on the notion that African leaders 
are corrupt, bad, non-liberal or non-progressive while African 
populations are prototype liberal individuals waiting and wanting 
British representation.41 It has led to donor attempts at political and 
social reform in Africa, in which continuing aid and debt relief are 
granted to governments in return for democratic reform, good 
governance initiatives and an observance of human rights. It is 
carried through by policies such as DfID’s ‘Drivers of Change’ 
project whereby ‘progressive’ leadership and policy environments 
                                                 
40 Interview, 27 June 2007 
41 Young: ‘A Project to be Realised’ 
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are encouraged.42 In pursuing this policy, Britain has chosen an 
approach that is ‘different from politics as usual’, defining Africa as 
a ‘noble cause’, above normal grubby self-interest, emphasising its 
affinity with and ability to represent African people in a 
disinterested way.43  
 
Third, it is argued that the Chinese engagement with Africa is 
motivated by an almost gluttonous need for raw materials and new 
markets, driven by a monolithic and powerful Chinese state that 
defines and directs policy. Unlike the British, the Chinese are all 
about material self-interest.44 Because of this selfishness, the 
Chinese are not interested in addressing Africa’s real problems – 
which have been defined within the prevailing universal liberal 
norms as those of governance and human rights abuses. And so, 
four, by engaging with corrupt leaders, they are spoiling Britain’s 
good work. 
 
‘The Chinese are all over Africa,’45 and they ‘will work with 
anybody. They put no conditions, make no demands, get very 
                                                 
42 See: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre 
website: http//www.gsdrc.org  
43 Blair: ‘Speech on Africa, Addis Ababa, 7 October 2004’ 
44 Such a view both underestimates Chinese ideological 
motivations, and the plurality of Chinese actors. See Ian Taylor: 
China’s New Role in Africa, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009) and 
Alden et al (eds): China Returns to Africa 
45 Interview, Baroness Jenny Tonge, Liberal Democrat 
Spokesperson on International Development, 1997-2004, 17 May, 
2007 
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good deals.’46 Given the poor records of many African 
governments, China’s approach of working to support existing 
regimes is inherently damaging to Africa. ‘China is a very ruthless 
player in Africa… China is prepared to overlook what is going on on 
the ground, providing its interests are served, the classic example 
being Sudan where they are a major investor in terms of oil and 
politically they block most attempts to resolve the catastrophe in 
Darfur.’47  
 
In particular it is frequently pointed out that China’s dealings with 
African elites are corrupting and damaging to western attempts to 
inhibit their excesses. ‘The list of [China’s] “friends”… would not 
look out of place in a rogues’ gallery.’48 In particular, China’s 
support for Robert Mugabe and Omar al-Bashir is seen as 
entrenching the abuse of human rights and prolonging suffering in 
Zimbabwe and Sudan. ‘It’s been very difficult to get any sanctions 
against the [Sudanese] regime, precisely because of the [Chinese] 
assertion of self-interest.’49  
 
                                                 
46 Interview, Jeremy Corbyn, MP, Chair, All-Party Parliamentary 
Group on Angola, 31 January 2007 
47 Interview, Chris Mullin, MP, Minister for Africa, 2003-5, 21 
March 2007 
48 Baroness Rawlings, comments during the House of Lords Debate, 
‘Africa: Chinese Investment’ 6 February 2007, 
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2007-02-06b.593.233 
[cited, 19 May 2009] 
49 Interview, John Bercow, MP, Conservative Spokesman for 
International Development, 2003--5, 23 April 2007 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Cambridge University Press in Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 37 No. 5, 2293-2310. Published version available from:  
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001622 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26246/  
  
25 
 
British state actors argue that western donors’ attempts to reform 
or remove Africa’s rogues through conditionalities or sanctions, 
were slowly beginning to have the desired effects.  But ‘that’s all 
going to go by the board if China does what it’s doing.’50 
 
The Chinese investment in Africa is potentially the 
most destabilising force that there is… If you look at 
Zimbabwe and the way in which the EU has tried to 
impose sanctions and there’s been all this quiet 
diplomacy involving the other south African states, 
and then China just goes in and provides them with all 
their oil on the basis that they get access to a whole 
range of industries and markets and resources there. 
Faced with that it’s very difficult to put pressure on a 
regime and pressure on UK companies… If you have an 
approach which is very managed, very technocratic, 
and therefore sometimes quite difficult for politicians 
to come to grips with, very idealistic, and progresses 
quite slowly, in a very painstaking fashion… and then 
China comes along and says, give us your rainforest 
and we’ll give you a billion quid, let’s forget about all 
this grief to get a few million from the UK, let’s go with 
China. That’s where the problem is.51  
 
                                                 
50 Interview, John Austin, MP, Chair, All-Party Parliamentary 
Group on Ethiopia, 19 February 2007 
51 Interview, Sally Keeble, MP, International Development Minister, 
2002-3, 4 June 2007 
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Because the Chinese package appears more attractive to corrupt 
African elites, the British will be squeezed out and Africa’s poor will 
suffer. ‘People are very apprehensive of [China’s] rapid expansion 
in Africa. Part of our fear may well be that after a long period of 
being able to influence what happens in Africa, this is slipping from 
our grasp. Yet there are real reasons to be deeply apprehensive 
about what is happening.’52 
 
It is not only the buttressing of Africa’s corrupt regimes that 
disturbs British politicians. China’s policy, which is depicted as 
following economic and political self-interest, means that its 
attempts to sell goods in Africa will swamp African markets and 
squeeze out local manufacturing. Where China does move 
production to Africa, it is widely believed that Chinese workers are 
imported, limiting local employment. Moreover, China’s own 
rapid development presents ‘a real danger that people in African 
countries are going to be left right behind’.53 
 
A debate in the House of Lords in 2007, in which speakers lined up 
to agree with each other, illustrates the strength of feeling about the 
corrupting influence of China and the way in which this is a subject 
of consensus across the political parties. It expresses the common 
                                                 
52 Baroness Lindsay Northover, comments during the House of 
Lords Debate, ‘Africa: Chinese Investment’ 6 February 2007, 
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2007-02-06b.593.233 
[cited, 19 May 2009] 
53 Interview, Baroness Lindsay Northover, Liberal Democrat 
Spokesperson for International Development, 2003-present, 14 
June 2007 
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feeling that British idealism in Africa can be clearly contrasted with 
Chinese realism. Two quotes give a flavour: 
 
The Chinese have shown little or no interest in issues 
such as the rule of law, free elections, respect for 
human rights and stamping out corruption. They dish 
out the loans, the gifts and the pet projects with no 
questions asked, sometimes supporting and even 
propping up very dubious regimes under the rubric, 
which is so important to them internationally, of 
mutual non-interference. So the infrastructure created 
and the new loans made may suit the African regimes 
concerned but may not be in the long-term interests of 
the host country concerned. [Compare this with]… the 
response of governments such as our own, which have 
taken an excellent lead on Africa… The enlightened 
world community has, by and large, got the right 
approach at last to Africa.54 
 
What about the wonderful work in cancelling world 
debt? Again, Her Majesty’s government have been in 
the forefront of that; will they watch that the new 
governments of Africa do not create fresh 
indebtedness, so that in a few years’ time we find that 
the campaign has to start all over again… As Africans 
                                                 
54 Lord Holme of Cheltenham, comments during the House of 
Lords Debate, ‘Africa: Chinese Investment’ 6 February 2007, 
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2007-02-06b.593.233 
[cited, 19 May 2009] 
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say, it is better to teach a person to fish than to give 
them a fish, because the chances are likely that they 
will get their economy going properly. Her Majesty’s 
government have assisted countries in Africa, teaching 
them how to fish without necessarily just giving the 
fish. The Chinese are arriving, giving a lot of fish.55 
 
The depiction of China as a potentially destructive player in Africa, 
is employed over and over again as a useful foil to Britain’s 
virtuous role there. China’s role as villain becomes an amplification 
of the way African elites are perceived as corrupt, disruptive and 
outside the moral order. 
 
 
China as a partner in Africa 
 
Alongside these popular negative depictions, an alternative 
government discourse about China’s engagement in Africa is 
emerging, one that suggests that Chinese actors can be civilised and 
absorbed – socialised – into the liberal cosmopolitan order. In this 
depiction, China is a potential partner in British good work in Africa, 
and potentially part of the international consensus. This official line 
on China in Africa has been driven by a number of key officials from 
DfID and the FCO and it has recently become more visible and 
influential. It is defined and explained within the FCO ‘Framework for 
                                                 
55 Archbishop of York, comments during the House of Lords 
Debate, ‘Africa: Chinese Investment’ 6 February 2007, 
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2007-02-06b.593.233 
[cited, 19 May 2009] 
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Engagement’ published in January 2009. The document sets out 
China’s growing importance and explains why and how the UK hopes 
to benefit from a closer relationship with it. The basis for the 
framework is explained in Gordon Brown’s introduction in which he 
says: ‘I am convinced that Britain, Europe and the rest of the world 
can benefit from China’s rise – provided we get our response right.’56 
The first benefits are to Britain’s own interests, served by closer 
cooperation with China as a trading partner. The second are to the 
wider international objectives that China can, if brought to behave 
responsibly, help to serve. The chief of these are carbon emissions 
and African development.57 
 
As Daniel Large points out, ‘reactions to the perceived dramatic 
irruption of China into the continent are almost as revealing about the 
preoccupations of different involved actors concerning the rise of 
China in world affairs, and the track-record of previous involvement 
by external partners in Africa, as the nature of the Chinese 
engagement in the continent per se’.58 The line followed in the 
framework document very explicitly makes a bid for Chinese 
affection, to ‘get in there’ with a partner of increasing economic and 
political importance. There are far more overt material interests in 
the UK-China relationship than in the UK-Africa relationship. Part of 
                                                 
56 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The UK and China: a 
framework for Engagement, p 3 
57 Ibid, p 4 
58 Daniel Large: ‘Africa’s international China relations: contending 
imaginaries and changing politics amidst the realities of 
consolidation’, in preparation for Jacques Mangala (ed.) Africa in 
Contemporary International Relations (Palgrave, forthcoming 2010). 
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the question for British officials then is how to reconcile such interests 
with the more idealist approach to Africa policy.  
 
There are two, interlinking answers to this problem. The first is based 
on the idea that China can be socialised, more specifically that Britain 
can ‘tame’ China, to bring it round to responsible and right-minded 
action in its international dealings (following Chakrabarty). ‘This is 
about encouraging an approach of responsible sovereignty on 
international and global issues, from proliferation and international 
security to sustainable development and climate change. It’s also 
about helping China to define its interests increasingly broadly.’59 The 
second sees China pushed into the ‘right kinds of behaviour’ by 
increasing interdependence, a very rational account of international 
politics along the lines of utopian liberalism as defined by E. H. Carr: 
what Britain seeks to do because of its interest in the welfare of 
Africans, China will eventually have to pursue because of its self-
interest.60  
                                                 
59 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The UK and China: a 
framework for Engagement, p 5 
60 See E. H. Carr: The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1991-1939, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001) Clare Short, Secretary of State for International 
Development between 1997 and 2002, described the Government’s 
approach to ‘enlightened self-interest’ or harmonious interests in 
the following way: ‘Whether it was the case in the past, and it 
probably was in the heyday of Empire, that what was morally right 
and what was in Britain’s self-interest were probably contradictory, 
it is no longer the case. And I mean that, I’m not just rationalising it. 
And that’s a delight because you don’t have any confusion, you can 
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China’s role in Africa can thus be discussed within an assumption that 
its objectives are essentially those of Britain. China is purported to 
share a British desire to see the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals and increases in aid – shared objectives that 
‘make it easy for Britain to work with China’.61 This view at times 
appears to represent China and Britain as like-minded partners 
working together for the welfare of Africans. Or, assumptions about a 
universal, technical approach to engagement in Africa come into play. 
For instance, one comment frequently made by officials concerns the 
unsustainability of China’s much-vaunted policy of non-interference 
which the realities of working in Africa will inevitably erode. British 
objectives of stability and capacity-building in Africa follow a logic 
which China will come to appreciate are in its own interests. China ‘is 
slowly moving on policies of non-intervention. It’s got to because 
Africa is complicated. It’s messy. The deeper you get in, the more you 
need to commit to development in Africa – to respond to the many 
voices jumping up and down over China. They must slowly realise 
that they cannot just deal with state leaders.’62 
 
Together, these imply a potentially harmonious conflation of British 
material interests and British ideological ambitions. ‘We should keep 
working more closely with China, demonstrating why good 
governance, sustainable development, donor coordination and aid 
                                                                                                                                           
just get on with what’s right: it’s in Africa’s interest, it’s in Europe’s 
interest, it’s in the world’s interest.’ Interview, 6 June 2007 
61 Comment made by a DfID official, 12 October, 2009 
62 Ibid. 
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effectiveness improve development outcomes and will help secure 
China’s own rapidly growing stake in the developing world.’63 
 
Privately, officials are not always rosy-eyed about what they describe 
as China’s tendency to pursue self-interest at the expense of 
development objectives in Africa. However, they echo the public line 
when they suggest that, even if the relationship can be exploitative, it 
also may have plenty to offer Africa, if it is slightly redirected along the 
right lines. Thus, as one official told me, ‘Our ambition is to attempt to 
bring China into a common conversation about Africa and 
development there.’64 
 
 
DfID and FCO officials are busy trying to make this work in practice. 
There is discussion of Chinese cooperation with DfID and attempts to 
define suitable join ventures and programmes. The discourse 
represents China as coming late to a concern for development in 
Africa and Britain being in a good position to teach it what the proper 
direction and focus should be.65 Once again, this is in some senses an 
amplification of the idealisation Britain projects onto Africa itself in 
its imagination of the African poor as essentially prototype liberal 
individuals waiting for British actors to help them realise the type of 
government they desire. In the case of China, it depicts the Chinese as 
                                                 
63 Ibid, p 11 
64 Conversation with FCO official, 1 October, 2009 
65 See for example, the DfID paper ‘Promoting Growth in Africa: 
working with China’, published on the DfID website: 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/china-africa-
factsheet.pdf [cited, 16 October 2009] 
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being awoken to the logic of liberal-style intervention in Africa as in 
everyone’s best interests. 
 
The Chinese appear slightly bemused by this line, remaining 
protective of China’s avowed approach of non-interference in Africa, 
which they see as coming from common experiences of colonialism, 
developing country and non-aligned status, and their own ability to 
reduce poverty which is based on their recent unparalleled experience 
of rapid economic development.66 Hongying Wang argues that the 
possibilities for China’s socialisation are limited. In a discussion of the 
ways in which China has begun to become more active in multilateral 
initiatives, he points to the essentially instrumental approach China 
takes. ‘The PRC’s commitment to the principles of qualitative 
multilateralism is constrained by the government’s determination to 
preserve national sovereignty, its insistence on policy flexibility, and 
its lingering anxiety that multilateralism may be an instrument 
serving American interests in the region’.67 Multilateralism is ‘simply a 
strategic tool of the Chinese government. As such, its applicability 
seems entirely negotiable if the material conditions should change’.68 
There is already evidence of the limits of multilateral cooperation 
from the European Union whose efforts to forge closer cooperation 
with the Chinese on a range of issues have been frustrated to the point 
that the European Council on Foreign Relations report on Chinese 
                                                 
66 Conversation with a Chinese diplomat, 4 November, 2009 
67 Hongying Wang. ‘Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: the 
limits of socialization’, Asian Survey, (2000), 40, no. 3, p 484 
68 Ibid, p 486 
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cooperation with the European Union, has argued that China is 
treating the EU ‘with diplomatic contempt’. 69 
 
If China’s potential socialisation is as limited as this suggests, how will 
Britain cope? Perhaps it will be less of a problem than it might appear, 
at least in terms of the British self-conception as a liberal actor. In the 
concluding section of the article I will suggest that the continuation of 
China as villain in Africa might even provide a sense of relief for 
British actors. This, I think, highlights a sense of ambiguity over the 
potentially universalism of liberalism. 
 
 
Conclusion: suggestions on the dual approach 
 
How can we read this double approach and what might happen next? I 
here explore two possible answers. The first pursues the idea that the 
two approaches might need and continue to coexist, and the second 
suggests the idea that interests might increasingly dominate British 
policy in Africa, overcoming or at least balancing out more idealist 
influences. 
 
First, what might it mean that both demonization of China and an 
attempt to rehabilitate China coexist?  I have argued that both 
contribute to Britain’s identity as a good actor in Africa. The need 
to demonise China, to see its activity as flat and alien supports 
Britain’s role in Africa as idealised and good. Such conceptions are 
durable – and historically resonant – and find popular 
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representations in the media. They also amplify existing British 
conceptions of corrupt African leaders, Africa’s conflicts, Africa’s 
diseases, Africa’s conflict and Africa’s chaos as malign and 
frightening: in other words, they reinforce the ways in which the 
idea of Africa has come to constitute British self-identity. At the 
same time, Britain as a tutor and civiliser of China also offers a 
contribution to Britain’s self-conception as a significant world 
player and liberal evangelist.  
 
And yet the potential socialization of China must presumably 
disable opportunities for demonization: the two approaches appear 
contradictory. Julia Kristeva, in her work on European 
cosmopolitanism, explores its philosophical struggle with erasing 
difference, of extending political order – the concept of 
universalism – which she traces to the ancient Greeks who defined 
the barbarian as the enemy of civilisation. ‘And yet the barbarians 
were fascinating, and, as if echoing the Sophists, writers would 
distinguish good barbarians from the bad, the best obviously being 
those who were perfectable – those who could be assimilated into 
Greek culture.’70  
 
Here is an apparent tension between the desire to remain 
fascinated by difference and the desire to incorporate it. Kristeva 
traces this tension throughout the history of European thought. 
‘Difference’, she argues, can be understood as both involving the 
projection of denied aggression, and an enjoyment of watching its 
progress. This attempt to evacuate and control the uncomfortable 
                                                 
70 Julia Kristeva: Strangers to Ourselves, translated by Leon S. 
Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p 52 
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or aggressive leads to a form of cosmopolitanism that defines 
otherness on one’s own terms and seeks to subject it to supposedly 
universal principles.71  
 
The perception of China’s villainy might therefore be seen as 
stemming from and reinforcing a British denial of aggression. 
Whereas Britain is imagined as purely benign in its dealings with 
Africa, all aggression is projected onto China. The refusal to see 
China’s role as complex – its varied actors, its mixture of motives, 
the variety of relationships involved – leaves China to represent a 
mirror image, villain to the British hero. China’s otherness 
provides a depository for the aggression and difference that are 
denied in the British relationship with Africa. 
 
Moreover, I want to suggest that this projected aggression is 
associated with an excited fascination: is there something almost 
pleasurable in the British fascinated horror of watching China’s 
supposed venality in Africa? This is an amplification of the 
tendency to demonise some African political leaders, to dwell on 
‘the horror’ of corruption and conflict that for many provides 
Africa’s most distinguishing features. I am thinking here of the type 
of writing typified by Robert Kaplan in his article ‘The Coming 
Anarchy’ which presents a picture of African descending into a 
hellish state of chaos and horror.72 Much of the recent press 
coverage of China in Africa strikes a very similar note with 
headlines such as ‘How China has created a new slave empire in 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
72 Robert Kaplan: ‘The Coming Anarchy’, Atlantic Monthly, February 
1994 
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Africa’, ‘Why China is trying to colonise Africa’ and ‘How China is 
taking over Africa, and why the West should be VERY worried’.73 
Such media coverage reflects the extreme end of ‘the horror’ but is 
essentially commensurate with the views expressed by some state 
elites. 
 
In his discussion of American-Sino relations, Gries describes an 
ongoing ritual whereby the ‘Chinese, like the Americans, project 
their fears and fantasies onto our bilateral relations’,74 a common 
theme in international relationships. In this case, aggression and 
fear, denied in an idealised relationship with Africa, needs a home. 
As a result, the possibility of political complexity is denied by the 
projection of extremes of good and bad – seen in discourse about 
‘good guys/bad guys’; ‘for us/against us’. The idea of Chinese ‘bad 
guys’ coming to the defence of Africa’s ‘bad guys’, and 
undermining the efforts of us, the ‘good guys’, is a process that is at 
                                                 
73 Peter Hitchens: ‘How China has created a new slave empire in 
Africa’, Mail Online, 28 September 2008, 
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1063198/PETER-
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once understandable and even manageable within the context of an 
Africa that, although ‘other’, is known and safe. As such China 
intensifies the way Britain imagines Africa, and provides relief to 
its conception of itself.  
 
This tendency to demonise a third actor is clearly not a specifically 
liberal response to international relationships and the idea of the 
other. Indeed Kristeva argues that the projection of aggression, 
rather than the inevitability of rationality, that is the basis of what 
is universal to humans.75 In his analysis of the online story of China 
and Africa, Shen finds many references to the superiority of the 
Chinese approach to that of America and Europe which is ‘never 
sincere’ while the ‘unconditional aid offered by the Chinese “is not 
another form of colonialism” but grants the Africans “a sense of 
confidence that cannot be gained from the Europeans”’.76 Shen 
suggests that: ‘Africans have become convenient straw men 
through whom Chinese internet users can project their wished-for 
Chinese identities.’77 He captures the blend of contempt for 
Africans and an idealisation of China’s help for Africa which 
underlines my two points of the projection of aggression and this 
sense of over-keen involvement in a pathologised Africa. 
 
Finally, the dual British reaction to China in Africa points to an 
important characteristic of the very idealised liberal 
cosmopolitanism expressed in relation to Africa; namely a sense of 
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77 Ibid. 
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ambiguity about the universality of liberalism. China’s dual 
representation as outlying villain – beyond the ‘universal’ – and as 
potential ideological partner, underwrites this ambiguity. Is there 
simply too much to lose by China’s socialization? On the other 
hand, keeping the two discourses going draws on a tried and tested 
approach that allows for the projection and enjoyment of 
aggression and an aspiration to the rationalist fantasy of taming the 
aggression and enhancing the order and stability of the existing 
liberal hegemony which China will be brought to appreciate under 
the tutorship of Britain 
 
Such a position produces very little more than a familiar 
underpinning of a particular British self-conception, without 
enabling more widely productive relationships with either China 
or Africa. Moreover, with deepening relationships between Chinese 
and Africans that are beyond British control, it may also be 
unsustainable. The second explanation of the dual approach sees 
the emergence of a more rational official discourse as a sign that 
realism is slipping into the British-Africa relationship, albeit by 
virtue of British interests in China, and that this may muddy a 
sense of British idealisation of itself in Africa. Between an idealist 
view of the relationship with Africa and a more interest-based 
perspective on the relationship with China, British state actors are 
caught in the juxtaposition of ideas and interests, and may be 
forced to contemplate a thicker conception of each relationship.  
 
This could be an attempt to have it all ways, to keep Britain as a ‘good’ 
actor in Africa while it works harmoniously with China for its own 
and Africa’s best interests. In other words, rationality overcomes the 
aggression that Britain is projecting onto China. The  socialisation 
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discourse is suggestive here, implying that China is apparently to be 
enfolded within the benign liberal approach. In this depiction, the 
realities are smoothed into line rhetorically, through the idea that 
Britain has a pedagogical relationship with China as the new investor 
in African development. From a Kristevian perspective, difference has 
been contained and neutralised by the repression of aggression and an 
idealisation of universality. As Wong suggests, however, Chinese 
actors may well be reluctant to play along with this story. 
 
Alternatively, more ambiguity might be allowed to seep into the 
idealised Britain-Africa relationship and a more complex 
understanding of Britain and China in Africa would emerge, in which 
the mixture of realism and idealism is acknowledged. Such an 
approach would require that self-idealisation is relinquished – both 
that Britain is purely disinterested in Africa and that Britain can ‘tame’ 
China. It would demand better self-awareness, but it might also be 
symptomatic of a more mature, complex and integrated 
understanding of both relationships. 
